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CONSTITUTIONALIZATION* 
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Students of constitutional law tend to suspect pretty early on that the 
Constitution simply means whatever the Supreme Court says that it means.  
Rather than fight that intuition, I think it is best to treat the student insight as 
one of the basic starting assumptions when teaching a course in Constitutional 
Law.  The goal then becomes to help students figure out how best to maneuver 
and feel comfortable in a legal universe where the Constitution has only con-
tingent meaning. 
The Constitution is best understood as a repository of shifting cultural 
values.  Normative preferences that the culture holds dear at any particular 
point in time are commonly said to emanate from the Constitution, thereby 
giving those preferences an aura of fundamental or transcendent importance.  
But the view that the Constitution itself prescribes values in a way that is 
independent of prevailing cultural norms now seems obsolete.  The document 
is simply too imprecise, and is typically worded at too high a level of 
abstraction, for that view to be taken seriously in a culture that is striving to 
survive the insights of legal realism.  Rather, the post-realist Constitution 
emerges as a metaphor for privileged normative values.  And the practice of 
constitutional law emerges as the practice of generating constitutional meaning 
from normative preferences. 
The process of transforming normative preferences into constitutional law 
is overseen primarily by the Supreme Court, through the institution of judicial 
review.  Using its talent for analytical reasoning, the Court amalgamates input 
from various sources—including constitutional language, original intent, 
political theory, and pragmatic sensitivity—in a way that is intended to give 
operational meaning to the abstract principles said to emanate from the 
Constitution.  In the process of divining constitutional meaning, the Court must 
of course consult the culture’s prevailing normative values to ensure that the 
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Court’s constitutional pronouncements will be politically palatable.  But the 
Court cannot simply defer to prevailing political preferences, for that would 
collapse the important distinction between constitutional law and ordinary 
politics on which the enterprise of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism de-
pends for its legitimacy in a democratic society. 
The line between permissible constitutional interpretation (that is informed 
by prevailing cultural values) and impermissible constitutional pronouncement 
(that is simply a conduit for prevailing political preferences) can be a difficult 
line to discern.  And much of the Supreme Court’s constitutional exposition 
can be understood as an effort to explain why the Court’s decisions have not 
strayed from the permissible side of the line.  But ultimately, the distinction 
between constitutional law and ordinary politics becomes untenable.  Once 
scrutinized, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence appears not only 
to consist largely of political policy preferences but also to consist largely of 
the political policy preferences that are favored by a majority of the Court.  
Although the legitimacy of such judicial review is open to serious question, for 
present purposes, it is the process by which political preferences acquire 
constitutional stature that is of greater concern. 
What the Supreme Court does when it clothes its political policy 
preferences in the garb of constitutional law can be described as the process of 
constitutionalization.  The counter-majoritarian Court takes an action that 
would be viewed as having questionable legitimacy if the political or 
normative nature of the action were apparent, but the Court legitimates that 
action by arguing that the action is actually compelled by the Constitution.  
Among the analytical techniques that the Court uses to constitutionalize its 
policy preferences, three are of particular interest—as are their vulnerabilities.  
First, the Court often adopts tacit analytical baselines to mask the unstated 
political assumptions on which its constitutional assertions rest.  However, the 
technique of baseline shifting can often be used to illuminate those baseline 
assumptions in a way that deprives the Court’s arguments of their persuasive 
power.  Second, the Court often adopts a tacit level of generality in conducting 
legal analysis that is designed to increase the intuitive appeal of the Court’s ar-
guments.  However, by re-analyzing the Court’s arguments at a different level 
of generality, those arguments can often be shown to rest on unsupported po-
litical preferences that the Court has adopted.  Third, the Court typically 
structures its arguments in a syllogistic form designed to show that the Court’s 
conclusions follow logically from a set of non-controversial starting assump-
tions that the Court has made.  However, the Court’s arguments can often be 
deconstructed to show that the Court’s own starting assumptions lead not to 
the conclusion reached by the Court, but rather to the opposite conclusion.  
Although the use of these techniques is not limited to the realm of 
constitutional law, the meaning of the Constitution is heavily dependent upon 
the manner in which these techniques are invoked.  Therefore, teaching how 
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the process of constitutionalization works is a good way to teach both the 
pragmatic and theoretical dimensions of constitutional law. 
Part II of this Article discusses the concept of constitutionalization.  Part 
II(A) discusses the manner in which legal realism supplanted doctrinal 
formalism as the prevailing conception of judicial review.  Part II(B) discusses 
the emergence of constitutionalization as a means of protecting the legitimacy 
of judicial review from the insights of legal realism.  Part III discusses the 
rhetorical techniques that the Supreme Court often uses to constitutionalize 
normative preferences and the ways in which those techniques can be 
manipulated to expose the political nature of the Court’s decisions.  Part III(A) 
discusses the technique of baseline shifting.  Part III(B) discusses the technique 
of manipulating levels of generality.  Part III(C) discusses the technique of 
deconstruction.  Mastering the use of these techniques will not only help us 
decode what the Supreme Court is doing when it announces constitutional 
rules, but it will also help us to formulate arguments that we ourselves can use 
when we ask the Court to constitutionalize our own normative preferences.  
The article concludes that once Supreme Court constitutional adjudication 
comes to be widely regarded as a mere reflection of Supreme Court political 
preferences, society may wish to reconsider the advisability of judicial review.  
From the perspective of democratic self-governance, such reconsideration may 
well be overdue. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL REALISM 
Since the advent of legal realism, it has been difficult to argue with a 
straight face that the Constitution itself resolves the many contentious political 
disputes that are often said to be settled in its name.  Proponents and opponents 
of controversial practices such as abortion, school prayer, and affirmative 
action typically argue that the Constitution requires the outcomes that they 
personally prefer.  But because that claim can be made with equal amounts of 
logical appeal by advocates on both sides of such issues, it seems that the 
normative preferences of the advocates—rather than the provisions of the 
Constitution—serve as the genesis of the desired results.  That is the lesson of 
legal realism.  And in the wake of legal realism, we are forced to confront the 
realization that constitutional meaning is largely the outgrowth of political 
preferences possessed by those who have the power to constitutionalize their 
normative values. 
A. Legal Realism 
In the beginning, the Constitution was thought to contain a set of 
determinate legal rules and standards that a reviewing court could consult in a 
fairly mechanical manner to ascertain the constitutionality of a challenged 
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governmental action.1  Indeed, under the late-nineteenth-century formalist 
conception of law as a “science,” legal principles were thought to be 
“discovered” and refined through a process of successive adjudications that 
tested and retested judicial observations about the content of law in a manner 
that resembled the scientific method.2  That formalist view of law was 
important to the legitimacy of judicial review because it entailed only a 
minimal need for the exercise of judicial discretion, thereby avoiding the 
counter-majoritarian problem that would exist if the Supreme Court were seen 
to be substituting its policy preferences for the policy preferences of the repre-
sentative branches of government.3  Luckily, the legal principles embedded in 
the Constitution provided the external constraint on judicial discretion that was 
needed to ensure the counter-majoritarian legitimacy of judicial review in a 
democratic society.  And as long as the Supreme Court could credibly claim 
that it was “applying” law rather than “making” law, the politically unaccount-
able Court could avoid the charge that it was violating separation of powers 
principles by usurping policy-making authority from the elected branches.4 
Legal realism has now made the claim that the Court is simply “applying” 
the law contained in the Constitution a hard claim to accept.  Beginning as 
early as 1910, and proliferating during the 1920s and ‘30s, legal realists 
demonstrated that the ambiguities inherent in legal doctrine were so pervasive 
 
 1. This view of judicial review is captured by the following frequently quoted statement of 
Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler: 
It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or control the action of the 
people’s representatives.  This is a misconception. . . . When an act of Congress is ap-
propriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the 
judicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution 
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter 
squares with the former. 
297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936), quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36 (4th ed. 
2001).  Contemporaneous with the Butler decision, some commentators questioned whether such 
nondiscretionary judicial review was realistically possible. See, e.g., Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., 
Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 39 MICH. L. REV. 213, 227–28 (1940). 
And it has been suggested that not even Justice Roberts actually contemplated the degree of 
nondiscretionary judicial review that is often attributed to him.  See David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 531 
(1987). 
 2. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 20–37 
(1980) (discussing nineteenth-century conception of law as science). 
 3. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 35–45, 685–92 (discussing counter-majoritarian 
problems entailed in judicial review and contemporary theories of constitutional interpretation 
designed to constrain judicial discretion). 
 4. For example, President George W. Bush recently called for a constitutional amendment 
banning gay marriage, arguing that such an amendment is necessary to prevent activist judges 
from making law rather than merely applying law.  See Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Won’t 
Review Challenge to Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2004, at A2. 
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that courts could not realistically be expected to resolve those ambiguities 
without ultimately resting their decisions on the exercise of judicial discretion.  
The realists were skeptical about the value of legal rules and principles in 
predicting judicial outcomes, and they were distrustful of supposed universal 
truths in the context of law.5  This distrust of legal doctrine prompted some 
realists to shift their emphasis from law to various social sciences—such as 
sociology, psychology, and economics—as a way to ascertain the true basis of 
judicial decisions.  This spawned the now-ubiquitous “law and” movements 
that have paired law with other disciplines.6  Other realists chose to emphasize 
the importance of process—as opposed to substantive legal doctrine—in their 
efforts to justify the legitimacy of judicial decisions.7 
The Critical Legal Studies and Postmodern movements that began in the 
1970s and ‘80s took the realist rule skepticism insight to its logical next step.  
They applied realist rule skepticism to the claims of legal realism itself and 
argued that the indeterminacy highlighted by the realists in the context of legal 
doctrine also applied to the social science and process principles that the 
realists invoked to fill the void that had been created by their doctrinal in-
determinacy insights.  According to this Postmodern view, all principles are 
sufficiently indeterminate that they require resort to the normative values of the 
person applying those principles in order to acquire operational meaning.  As a 
result, Postmodernists deem all meaning to be contingent rather than universal 
and therefore subject to the biases and predispositions of whoever is engaged 
in the act of interpretation.  Although these more extreme Postmodern claims 
remain highly controversial, the rule skepticism and doctrinal indeterminacy 
insights of legal realism now seem to be both widely shared and widely 
regarded as preferable to the formalist account of law that preceded the advent 
 
 5. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 63–75 (discussing growth and nature of legal realism). 
Contemporary distrust of principled decision-making is the enduring legacy of the legal realists. 
See, e.g., In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652–53 (2d Cir. 1943) (Frank, J.) (arguing that 
prejudices and preconceptions shared by society, as well as idiosyncratic sympathies of judges, 
find expression in society’s legal system); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xiii, 
115 (6th ed. 1963) (arguing that judicial temperament, training, biases, and predilections 
influence decisions); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
3–4, 11–18, 393 (1960) (arguing that human psychology, particular circumstances, and inherent 
probabilities create a nonuniform pattern of decisions); cf. L.L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 
82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 435–38 (1934) (recognizing that judges often decide cases on policy 
grounds and then “wring” from doctrine an acceptable legal basis for the decision). 
 6. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978) (commenting on 
proliferation of “law and” movements in legal scholarship). 
 7. See BRIAN H. BIX, A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL THEORY 3–5 (2004) (discussing American 
legal realism and influence of social science and process theories); WHITE, supra note 2, at 63–75 
(discussing legal realist attraction to social science and process theories). 
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of legal realism.8  In fact, a common contemporary cliché insists that “we are 
all realists now.”9 
The insights of legal realism have important consequences for 
constitutional law.  If legal doctrine can no longer be counted on to insulate 
judicial decisions from the normative preferences of the judges who render 
them, the constitutional law that is being announced by judges will ultimately 
be shaped by the normative values of the judges themselves.  That, in turn, 
threatens the legitimacy of judicial review because the realist indeterminacy 
insight means that the Constitution itself can no longer be counted on to im-
pose any interesting degree of constraint on the exercise of judicial discretion.  
Stated more bluntly, there is nothing in the post-realist Constitution to prevent 
a judge from elevating that judge’s own normative or political preferences to 
the level of constitutional law.  And to make matters worse, the problem does 
not stem merely from the danger of judicial abuse at the hands of judges who 
are unable to exercise judicial self-restraint.  Rather, the problem stems from 
the fact that judicial discretion is a necessary incident of judicial interpretation 
because the force of the realist indeterminacy insight is that legal rules and 
standards have no operational content until some meaning has been supplied 
through recourse to a judge’s normative values. 
This does not mean that judges are free to do whatever they like when they 
are “interpreting” the Constitution.  There are meaningful, pragmatic, and 
political constraints on the exercise of judicial discretion.  For example, one of 
my colleagues once wrote an article arguing that the Constitution required 
socialism rather than capitalism as the Nation’s prevailing economic theory.10  
Although there are no logical flaws in the argument, everyone realizes that a 
contemporary court would never read the Constitution to require socialism.  
The economic and ideological forces that influence United States culture 
would not tolerate such an outcome.  But the constraints that prevent 
unacceptable exercises of judicial power are pragmatic and political in nature.  
They are not doctrinal constraints.  And because they are pragmatic and 
political, they cannot be counted on as a safeguard against abuses that are also 
pragmatic and political in nature.  Pragmatic and political constraints may be 
adequate to prevent extreme abuses of judicial discretion, but they cannot be 
trusted to guard against the normative preferences of judges in the cases that 
 
 8. See BIX, supra note 7, at 4–5, 161–62 (discussing Critical Legal Studies and 
Postmodernism).  See generally Note, ‘Round and ‘Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Re-
alism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670–76 (1982) (discussing 
progression from legal realism to Critical Legal Studies). 
 9. BIX, supra note 7, at 4; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 229 
(1986) (“‘We are all realists now.’ The statement has been made so frequently that it has become 
a truism to refer to it as a truism.”). 
 10. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980) (reviewing LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)). 
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are realistically likely to be presented to the courts for constitutional 
adjudication.  Controversies surrounding issues such as abortion, school 
prayer, and affirmative action are contentious precisely because there is no 
pragmatic or political consensus on how those issues should be resolved.  What 
that means, as a matter of constitutional law, is that those issues can be 
resolved only through recourse to the normative or political preferences of the 
judges who adjudicate them.  Once detached from the normative values of the 
decision-maker, the Constitution simply does not speak to the controversial 
policy issues of the day. 
B. Constitutionalizing Norms 
If judicial policy preferences—rather than the Constitution itself—are 
ultimately responsible for determining the constitutionality of controversial 
social practices such as abortion, school prayer, and affirmative action, the 
legitimacy of judicial review is called into serious question.  If all that judges 
are doing when they rule on the constitutionality of the day’s burning social 
issues is substituting their own policy preferences for the policy preferences of 
the representative branches of government, the institution of judicial review 
becomes difficult to square with the idea of democratic self-governance.  
Under our tripartite constitutional scheme of divided governmental powers, the 
politically accountable representative branches are given the power to 
formulate social policy.  The politically unaccountable, “least dangerous” judi-
cial branch11 is given the power to nullify those policy choices only when they 
violate norms that are contained in the Constitution—not when they merely 
offend judicial ideas of policy prudence.12  As a result, legal realism has forced 
the proponents of judicial review to propose justifications for the practice of 
judicial review that are designed to deflect the realist threat.  Theories ranging 
from hard originalism, to natural law deontology, to process-based 
representation reinforcement have been proposed.  To date, however, no post-
realist theory of judicial review has been able to overcome the power of the 
realist indeterminacy critique, and no theory has been able to command 
consensus support.13  Nevertheless, you may have noticed that the institution of 
 
 11. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962) (noting the view of Alexander Hamilton that the judiciary 
is less threatening to political rights than other branches of federal government and discussing the 
limited competence of the Supreme Court to make social policy). 
 12. See id. (discussing counter-majoritarian problem entailed in judicial review); STONE ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 35–45 (also discussing counter-majoritarian problem entailed in judicial 
review). 
 13. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 685–92 (discussing contemporary theories of consti-
tutional interpretation designed to constrain judicial discretion in way that avoids counter-
majoritarian problem). 
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judicial review is still alive and well in the United States, notwithstanding the 
lack of a satisfactory solution to the post-realist counter-majoritarian problem. 
The Supreme Court remains ultimately responsible for announcing 
constitutional rules in the United States, even though the contemporary Court 
is widely regarded as a political body.  The Court consists of a recognized 
liberal voting bloc and a recognized conservative voting bloc.  The 
conservative bloc presently comprises a political majority on the Court, and it 
typically prevails by 5–4 votes in cases involving controversial social issues.  
Close cases tend to be decided by the politically more moderate “swing” 
Justices on the Court.14  Supreme Court nominees, as well as controversial 
lower court nominees, are subject to having their appointments blocked in the 
Senate through filibusters—solely because of partisan opposition to their 
political views.15  And recently, partisan support for conservative nominees has 
even generated proposals to modify the long-standing Senate filibuster rules 
themselves, in order to prevent liberals in the Senate minority from blocking 
the appointment of conservative nominees who are viewed as having extreme 
political views.16  Political litmus tests are also commonly used to determine 
the judicial “qualifications” of potential nominees, and those litmus tests are 
used with equal vigor by members of both major political parties.17 
There can be little doubt that the judicial process is intensely political.18  
Politics determines judicial selection because those who select the judges 
suppose that politics will frequently determine how the selected judges will 
vote.  And there can be little doubt that this supposition is correct.  When the 
Supreme Court definitively “interprets” the Constitution, as the Court insists 
that it has the power to do,19 the Justices have little choice but to constitu-
tionalize their own normative values because the Constitution itself is too 
abstract to provide concrete case outcomes.  The provisions of the Con-
stitution, therefore, end up meaning whatever the political preferences of a 
Supreme Court majority cause them to mean at any given point in time.  The 
 
 14. See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE 
YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 159–64 (2000) (discussing 
Supreme Court voting blocs on affirmative action issues). 
 15. See Helen Dewar, Judiciary Panel Backs Specter: GOP Senators Elicit Pledge Not to 
Block Antiabortion Judges, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2004, at A6; Michael A. Fletcher & Helen 
Dewar, Bush Will Renominate 20 Judges: Fights in Senate Likely Over Blocked Choices, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 24, 2004, at A1. 
 16. See Dewar, supra note 15; Fletcher & Dewar, supra note 15. 
 17. See Dewar, supra note 15. 
 18. See id.; Fletcher & Dewar, supra note 15. 
 19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–20 (1958) (recognizing “the basic principle that the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,” and quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), for the proposition that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”). 
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First Amendment now protects subversive advocacy,20 even though it used to 
prohibit criticism of governmental policies.21  The Equal Protection Clause 
now prohibits racial segregation22 and discrimination against women,23 even 
though the Constitution used to permit both.24  The Due Process Clause now 
protects the right to abortion,25 even though that right did not exist before 
1973,26 and even though it might cease to exist after the next Supreme Court 
appointment.27  Throughout all of those changes in constitutional meaning, 
however, the language and original intent of the pertinent constitutional 
provisions has remained precisely the same.  The only thing that has changed 
is the normative values of the Justices—informed by their own political 
preferences and by their perceptions of the political leanings of the culture at 
large. 
Notwithstanding the obvious influence of judicial policy preferences on 
constitutional adjudication, the political character of judicial review has not 
produced the crisis in judicial legitimacy that one might have expected to 
follow the realist assault on the fig leaf of principled judicial neutrality.  Even 
after the Supreme Court arguably delegated to itself the power to choose the 
next President of the United States in its 2000 Bush v. Gore decision,28 the 
Court was able to escape largely unscathed from the vocal charges of po-
litically motivated decision making that ensued.29  One cannot help but wonder 
 
 20. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment pro-
tects subversive speech at Ku Klux Klan rally). 
 21. E.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that the First Amendment 
does not protect distribution of fliers claiming that military conscription violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 22. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregated education). 
 23. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit women to be excluded from unique 
Virginia military college). 
 24. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the Constitution permits 
Louisiana law requiring racial segregation of railroad passengers); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (holding that the Constitution permits Illinois law denying women license 
to practice law). 
 25. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects 
right to abortion). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537–38, 556, 560 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that new Supreme Court 
appointment could result in overruling right to abortion). 
 28. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S 98 (2000) (holding unconstitutional a Florida Supreme Court 
order to recount votes in the extremely close 2000 presidential election, thereby enabling George 
W. Bush to become President of the United States). 
 29. See Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 
YALE L.J. 1407, 1450–58 (noting there was only modest decline in popular support for the Court 
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why a society that is formally committed to the principle of democratic self-
governance would nevertheless permit the most controversial of its social 
policies to be determined by a politically unaccountable Supreme Court.  The 
answer seems to be that United States culture is also committed to a principle 
of liberal individual rights, whose protection from the whims of self-interested 
majorities is guaranteed by the Constitution.  And constitutional protection of 
liberal rights cannot work unless a counter-majoritarian body such as the 
Supreme Court can be trusted to enforce those rights against potentially 
oppressive political majorities. 
The realists have now demonstrated that the Supreme Court cannot reliably 
be trusted to perform this function in a non-political way—that the Supreme 
Court itself might be the fox that is guarding the henhouse gates.30  But that is 
an insight that society cannot acknowledge without risking a breakdown in the 
liberal conception of individual rights itself.31  It appears that United States 
culture likes the idea of judicial review so much that it is often willing simply 
to overlook the counter-majoritarian problem created by the influence of 
judicial politics on constitutional adjudication.  Rather than confront the 
separation of powers difficulties inherent in post-realist judicial review, the 
culture is inclined to accept any plausible invitation to look the other way when 
the Court permits its politics to influence its constitutional decisions. 
Professor Mark Tushnet once noted that Senate confirmation hearings for 
federal judicial nominees ritualistically require nominees to assure the 
Judiciary Committee that they will follow the intent of the framers and “apply” 
the law of the Constitution, rather than allow their own political views to 
“make” constitutional law.  That ritual is repeated in successive judicial 
nomination hearings, even though both the nominees and the Senators who 
question them ought to understand the hollowness of such assurances.32  How-
ever, the persistence of those recurrent confirmation ceremonies suggests that 
the rituals associated with judicial neutrality may be more important than the 
reality of judicial politics.  Performance rituals of this sort seek to reassure us 
about the legitimacy of judicial review, in the apparent belief that judicial 
 
in the wake of Bush v. Gore and suggesting ways in which the Supreme Court may end up 
retaining or increasing its political capital in the aftermath of the decision). 
 30. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (upholding institution of 
slavery); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding denial of women’s right 
to vote); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding exclusion order that led to 
World War II internment of Japanese-American citizens); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986) (upholding criminalization of homosexual conduct). 
 31. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781–86 (1983) (arguing that neutral constitutional 
principles needed for judicial enforcement of liberal constitutional rights can come only from a 
conservative communitarian tradition that denies the importance of liberal individual rights). 
 32. See id. 
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neutrality can be achieved through an act of will.  They do this both by 
distracting us from the fact that it is the normative values of judges that 
generate the content of constitutional law and by focusing our attention on the 
alternate ideal of judicial neutrality.  The rituals are not analytically responsive 
to the counter-majoritarian problem.  But they appear to work because we want 
them to work.  It is as if by reciting the words of a mantra frequently enough, 
we can make the aspirations of the mantra become true. 
Law obviously serves an important legitimating function in the United 
States.  In the past, we have relied on the legal system to justify practices such 
as slavery,33 the seizure of land from indigenous Indians,34 the wartime 
internment of Japanese-American citizens,35 and the refusal to allow women to 
vote.36  Now we rely on law to justify practices such as de facto racial 
discrimination,37 capital punishment,38 flag burning,39 nude dancing,40 and on-
line pornography.41  Whether such practices are Platonically “correct” could be 
endlessly debated, but we have generally accepted those practices as culturally 
appropriate when the Supreme Court has told us that they were constitutionally 
protected.  As long as the Court honors the rituals associated with judicial 
review, we tend to view as legitimate the practices that the Court has chosen to 
authorize. 
 
 33. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating congressional statute prohibiting 
slavery in Louisiana Territory). 
 34. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that European discovery of 
land now constituting the United States, and conquest of indigenous Indian inhabitants, divested 
Indians of title to that land). 
 35. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military exclusion order 
leading to internment of Japanese-American citizens). 
 36. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (upholding denial of women’s right 
to vote). 
 37. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (adopting 
expansive interpretation of de jure segregation but reaffirming prohibition on use of race-
conscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971) (same); cf., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) 
(reading Equal Protection Clause to permit racially disparate impact not directly caused by 
intentional discrimination). 
 38. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of capital 
punishment). 
 39. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating under First Amendment a Texas 
statute prohibiting flag desecration). 
 40. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (finding First Amendment protection 
for nude dancing but upholding requirement that dancers wear pasties and G-strings). 
 41. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds 
federal Child Online Protection Act, which criminalized commercial posting on World Wide Web 
of pornographic material that would be harmful to minors). 
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The ritual associated with judicial review that is of primary importance is 
the ritual of reasoned deliberation.42  As long as the Supreme Court can 
announce its constitutional rulings in ways that appear to flow from the 
application of neutral principles to the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, 
the Court’s rulings are likely to be generally accepted as legitimate.43  To do 
this, the Court’s opinions must, inter alia, demonstrate appropriate deference 
to precedent, to the text of the Constitution, to the intent of the framers, and to 
the rigors of syllogistic analysis.  Those opinions, of course, must also exude 
the presence of judicial neutrality.44  It is the form of reasoned deliberation that 
appears to legitimate the substance of the Court’s constitutional rulings.  This 
is true, even though the realists have taught us that judicial neutrality is likely 
to be only a matter of form. 
I am not suggesting that Supreme Court Justices are engaged in a 
conspiracy that is designed to trick the American electorate into ceding policy-
making power to the unelected judiciary.  On the contrary, I am suggesting that 
the Supreme Court is simply doing precisely what we ask the Court to do.  It 
is, of course, possible to view the Supreme Court as an agent of those who 
possess social power, whose judicial function is to manipulate those who lack 
social power into submitting to the demands of the existing power structure.45  
It is also possible to view the Court as a more sophisticated actor, whose true 
function is to convince us all that the existing distributional system operates 
fairly, so that those of us who lack power will continue to work within the 
existing system rather than trying to replace the system with more 
revolutionary alternatives.46  However appealing such accounts might at times 
appear to be, I am suggesting that something more subtle is going on. 
Professor Mark Kelman has argued that the process of successfully 
legitimating social practices and norms is more likely to be cognitive than 
conspiratorial in nature.47  The process is a largely passive one that relies more 
 
 42. See BICKEL, supra note 11, at 188 (emphasizing that the Supreme Court possesses 
“resources of rhetoric” to convince political branches and the public of the importance of 
principles that the Court espouses). 
 43. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 16–20 (1959) (emphasizing the importance to judicial review of constitutional 
adjudication based on neutral principles that are disinterested, detached from political 
determinants, and that transcend the result in the case at issue). 
 44. See id. at 17. 
 45. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 262–63 (1987) (describing 
the process of legitimation); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 153 (1993) (also describing the process 
of legitimation). 
 46. See KELMAN, supra note 45, at 262–63 (describing legitimation as a process of depicting 
resource distribution system as fair); see also SPANN, supra note 45, at 153 (also describing 
legitimation as a process of depicting resource distribution system as fair). 
 47. KELMAN, supra note 45, at 269–95. 
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on inertia than on guile.48  The practices and norms that are legitimated could 
easily be questioned if we ever thought to scrutinize them.  But it never occurs 
to us to subject them to analysis, because we simply accept them as foun-
dational assumptions.  Moreover, the culture’s repeated reliance on such tacit 
assumptions further reinforces those assumptions, so that over time they grow 
stronger and therefore even more immune from subsequent scrutiny.  This 
process of legitimation cannot fairly be termed conspiratorial because the 
legitimated assumptions actually have as much influence over those who gain 
power from their operation as over those to whom power is denied.49  The 
process works because it ends up defining the cognitive categories in which all 
of us grow accustomed to thinking.50  And, of course, the process works best 
when its operation is undetected. 
Accordingly, the reason that the institution of judicial review has been able 
to survive the realist indeterminacy insight—an insight that should have caused 
judicial review to suffer a crisis of democratic legitimacy—is that the 
normative values and political preferences of judges that are needed to provide 
constitutional meaning are constitutionalized in a manner that is largely hidden 
from view.  Because we want the process of judicial review to remain viable 
enough to prevent the collapse of our system of liberal constitutional rights, we 
have an interest in avoiding a confrontation with any theory that would 
threaten the coherence of that system of rights.  We are, therefore, a receptive 
audience that is eager to embrace judicial opinions whose form suggests that 
they emanate from constitutional principles.  And the institution of judicial re-
view should continue to work well, as long as we do not analyze those judicial 
opinions too closely. 
III.  ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
Abstractly, the normative values contained in our organic Constitution are 
the values of the culture at large, as those values shift and develop at various 
points along the path of our cultural evolution.  Operationally, however, the 
meaning of the post-realist Constitution is determined by the normative values 
and political preferences of the Supreme Court Justices who interpret the 
Constitution.  The adjudicatory process by which judicial norms are given 
constitutional stature depends for its legitimacy more on the form of the 
constitutional arguments that the Court offers to justify its rulings than on the 
substance of those arguments.  For those arguments to be convincing, it must 
appear that the Court’s constitutional conclusions flow logically from the 
 
 48. SPANN, supra note 45, at 153. 
 49. KELMAN, supra note 45, at 262. 
 50. See KELMAN, supra note 45, at 269–95 (describing legitimation as a process of defining 
categories of social thought); SPANN, supra note 45, at 153 (also describing legitimation as a 
process of defining categories of social thought). 
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provisions of the Constitution itself.  Consciously or unconsciously, the 
Supreme Court often hides its own normative values and political preferences 
in the interstices of its opinions, where they are not readily apparent or easily 
evaluated.  However, three analytical techniques are useful in uncovering the 
presence of such judicial preferences and in exposing the manner in which 
those preferences influence the Court’s decisions.  They are the techniques of 
baseline shifting, manipulating levels of generality, and deconstruction.  I 
believe that teaching students to master these techniques is a good way to teach 
Constitutional Law. 
Once students learn to use these techniques effectively, they will be able to 
identify for themselves the analytical weak spots in the Court’s opinions and 
the role that judicial politics has played in generating the Court’s decisions.  In 
addition, they will be able to use these techniques to manipulate doctrine for 
themselves and make the Constitution generate the outcomes that they deem 
desirable—which is the essence of practicing constitutional law.  But most 
importantly, once students learn to manipulate doctrine for themselves, they 
will no longer be able to doubt the legal realist critique of supposedly 
principled judicial decision making.  This will force students to confront 
directly the troublesome questions that are raised about the legitimacy of 
judicial review in a post-realist legal culture.  Perhaps there are still reasons 
why we should favor constitutionalization of the normative values and political 
preferences possessed by our judges.  But if such reasons exist, students will 
have to formulate them in order to justify to themselves the continued 
desirability of counter-majoritarian judicial review. 
A. Baseline Shifting 
One way to expose the judicial preferences lying beneath the surface of a 
court’s opinion is to focus on the baseline assumptions that the court makes in 
reaching its decision.51  A good way to understand the concept of baseline 
shifting is to view a baseline as the thing that separates the propositions that an 
argument explicitly addresses from the propositions that the argument simply 
assumes without discussion.  The propositions that receive explicit attention 
are located above the analytical baseline.  The propositions whose validity is 
tacitly assumed lie beneath the baseline. 
 
 51. Portions of the baseline-shifting discussion included in this subsection are taken from 
text that I originally wrote for multimedia Contracts teaching materials prepared with Professors 
John Weistart and H. Jefferson Powell at the Duke University School of Law in 2001.  Although 
those materials have not been published in any traditional form, they are contained on a 
multimedia DVD that the three authors and others have used to teach their first-year Contracts 
courses.  See Videotape: The Contracts Experience (Duke University School of Law 2003) (on 
file with the author). 
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Legal arguments made in support of particular propositions—including the 
arguments made in judicial opinions—always address issues that are above the 
analytical baseline.  But their persuasive power often rests on tacit assumptions 
that lie beneath the baseline. If the tacit assumptions that drive a legal 
argument can be exposed and scrutinized, the argument may lose some of its 
persuasive force.  The tacit assumptions on which a legal argument rests can 
often be exposed by shifting the analytical baseline so that the tacit 
assumptions can then be more readily scrutinized.  In other words, baseline 
shifting enables us to evaluate the legitimacy of baseline assumptions that we 
might otherwise simply take for granted. 
It is easiest to understand the concept of baseline shifting by using a 
concrete example.  Here is a simple one.  In the 1872 case of Bradwell v. 
Illinois,52 the United States Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Illinois 
Supreme Court that denied a married woman the right to practice law.  The Illi-
nois Supreme Court justified its decision in part by noting that one of the 
things that lawyers had to be able to do was enter into enforceable contracts 
with their clients.53  Because Illinois law did not permit married women to 
make legally binding contracts in their own names, it followed that married 
women could not be permitted to practice law.54  The United States Supreme 
Court affirmed that decision on the grounds that the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
gender-based denial of the right to practice law did not violate the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the United Stated Constitution.55 
The portion of the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion denying Ms. Bradwell 
a license to practice law on contract incapacity grounds was explicit.56  It 
existed above the analytical baseline.  However, the argument rested on a tacit 
assumption that the Illinois law prohibiting women from making contracts was 
itself defensible.  Although the Court’s conclusion was utterly dependent upon 
the legitimacy of that assumption, the Court’s opinion never even addressed 
the issue.  Rather, the contractual incapacity assumption performed its 
dispositive function from its hiding place beneath the analytical baseline.57 
By shifting the baseline down—so that the assumed inability of women to 
make contracts rises above the baseline, where its legitimacy can be 
scrutinized—the Court’s argument loses any persuasive power that it might 
have had back in 1873.  The assumption that married women lacked the 
capacity to make their own contracts was rooted in the belief that the property 
 
 52. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). 
 53. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (Ill. 1869). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139. 
 56. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. at 535 (discussing the effect of contractual incapacity). 
 57. Id. at 539–40 (never attempting to justify contractual incapacity of married women). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
724 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:709 
and business affairs of married women were best handled by their husbands.58  
Today, that view seems silly.  But it seems silly only because we have now 
taken the trouble to scrutinize it.  In 1873, when the dependence of married 
women on the superior judgment of their husbands was simply assumed 
without scrutiny, the assumption was able to drive the argument that women 
were not fit to practice law.  And it was able to do so from beneath the 
baseline, where its influence was largely undetected. 
Sometimes it is fairly obvious that a legal argument rests on a tacit 
assumption whose validity has not been established.  In such circumstances, 
the baseline shifting needed to expose and evaluate the tacit assumption may 
occur easily and automatically.  Few people in the twenty-first century would 
be tricked into believing that women could not practice law through blind 
acceptance of a nineteenth-century baseline assumption that women lack the 
capacity to contract.  However, sometimes legal arguments rest on tacit as-
sumptions that are too subtle for most of us to recognize at first glance.  In 
such cases, considerable conscious effort may be required to shift the 
analytical baseline down far enough to expose those assumptions.  Indeed, 
creative forms of legal argument that challenge traditional ways of thinking are 
often necessary to expose some of our most influential cultural assumptions.  
That is because those assumptions are so firmly rooted that we never think to 
question them.  Here is an example: 
In its famous 1905 Lochner v. New York decision,59  the United States 
Supreme Court gave the doctrine of freedom of contract constitutional status.  
The Court invalidated a New York statute regulating the maximum number of 
hours that bakers could work in any one week or in any one day.60  The law 
had been passed as a health and safety measure, designed to reduce some of the 
dangers that the New York legislature found to be posed by the excessive 
hours that bakers were being forced to work by their employers.61  The 
Supreme Court held, however, that the statute violated the United States 
Constitution because the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of employers and employees 
to make whatever employment contracts they desired without state interference 
in the form of maximum hours regulation.62 
The decision was controversial at the time it was issued, but it has now 
been largely repudiated, both by commentators and by the Supreme Court 
 
 58. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139–42 (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is, or should be, 
woman’s protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to 
the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”). 
 59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 60. Id. at 64. 
 61. Id. at 57–63. 
 62. Id. at 64. 
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itself.63  For present purposes, however, what is important is identifying the 
tacit baseline assumption on which that historic decision rested.  The Supreme 
Court held that freedom of contract was protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the United States Constitution.64  The Court further equated freedom of con-
tract with the economic theory of laissez-faire capitalism—the belief that 
markets should not be distorted by government intervention.65  The bulk of the 
majority opinion in Lochner was directed to the question of whether the 
occupation of being a baker was sufficiently hazardous to justify the need for 
regulation by the New York statute as a health and safety measure.66  Because 
the Supreme Court majority believed that the statute could not be so justified, 
it viewed the statute as a form of economic regulation, rather than as a form of 
health and safety regulation.67  And as economic regulation, the statute 
impermissibly violated the doctrine of laissez-faire freedom of contract.68 
Stated more succinctly, the majority thought that the New York legislature 
was siding with the bakers rather than the employers in the labor contract 
negotiations that occurred between the two concerning hours of employment.69  
For the Supreme Court majority, this violated freedom of contract because the 
capitalist market rather than the state should determine the terms of a 
contract.70  By siding with the bakers in their negotiations with their 
employers, the state provided a subsidy to the bakers in the form of increased 
bargaining power.71  In economic terms, this subsidy distorted natural market 
ordering because it gave bakers artificial bargaining power that they would not 
possess in the absence of the market-distorting statute.72  This is commonly 
understood to be the import of the majority opinion in Lochner,73 and the 
Court’s argument was presented above the analytical baseline in a way that 
was very visible.74 
However, the Court’s opinion diverted analytical attention to the issue of 
what did and did not constitute a permissible piece of health and safety 
 
 63. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 718–29 (discussing the widespread condemnation and 
ultimate demise of the Lochner decision). 
 64. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
 65. See id. at 53–54. 
 66. See id. at 57–63 (discussing the public health and safety justifications behind the 
enactment of the statute). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 64 (holding that the statute violated the constitutionally protected right to 
freedom of contract). 
 69. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63. 
 70. STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 723. 
 71. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 718–23 (discussing the freedom of contract 
implications of Lochner). 
 74. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
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legislation.75  In so doing, the Supreme Court majority was able to take 
advantage of a tacit assumption lying beneath the baseline that gave the 
majority’s argument whatever persuasive power it possessed.  The majority 
tacitly assumed that the economic market in existence before New York 
enacted its statutory subsidy to bakers was a natural market.  However, once 
the analytical baseline is shifted down to expose the unstated assumption that 
the pre-Lochner market was a natural market, the assumption can be subjected 
to analytical scrutiny.  After such scrutiny, the tacit assumption becomes 
highly questionable. 
Even prior to the enactment of the Lochner statute, the economic market 
was riddled with government subsidies.76  For example, government right-of-
way land grants subsidized railroads by permitting them to deflect some of 
their business costs to the taxpayers.77  In addition, the government provided 
employers with more general subsidies, such as police and fire department ser-
vices, which enabled employers to avoid the costs that they would otherwise 
need to incur in order to secure their own private police and fire protection.  
Even more subtly, the very existence of contract law is itself a “market-
distorting” subsidy.  In the absence of state-provided contract law and state-
provided courts to enforce contracts, contracting parties would have to incur 
the expense of self-help measures to secure the enforcement of their 
agreements. 
All of these subsidies made the market that pre-existed the Lochner statute 
a market that was far from a natural market.  Accordingly, once the baseline is 
shifted down to permit examination of the assumption on which Lochner 
rested—that the pre-Lochner market was a natural market—the Lochner 
opinion ends up simply favoring one form of market subsidization over 
another.  The Lochner opinion makes it clear that a majority of the Court had 
normative values and political preferences that favored employer-oriented 
business subsidies over labor-oriented redistributive subsidies.  But although 
the Court’s policy preferences determined the outcome of the case, those 
judicial preferences were never addressed, analyzed, or defended in the 
Lochner opinion. 
Shifting the analytical baseline also suggests that the natural market ideal 
of Lochner is merely a metaphysical abstraction that cannot exist in real life.  
Regardless of how one feels about the various competing market subsidies that 
are at issue in Lochner, the decision looks very different once the tacit baseline 
 
 75. See id. at 57–63. 
 76. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 723 (noting that Lochner adopted a “bad” 
baseline by assuming that the pre-Lochner market was free of redistributive subsidies). 
 77. See generally Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-
to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to 
the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 365–89 (2000) (discussing the history of 
government land grant subsidies to railroads). 
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assumption has been exposed and scrutinized than it did when the natural mar-
ket assumption remained hidden beneath the baseline.  The Lochner illustration 
also demonstrates that creative lawyering can often reveal baseline as-
sumptions that might otherwise be easily overlooked.  It further suggests that 
we may often be able to uncover some unexamined baseline assumptions lying 
beneath our commonly held beliefs, if only we have the time, skill, and incen-
tive to uncover them.78 
Baseline shifting can also be used to illuminate the undefended judicial 
policy preferences that lie beneath the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
controversies surrounding more contemporary issues of social policy.  The 
issue of abortion is obviously quite controversial in current United States 
culture.  The way that one feels about the issue is likely to be determined in 
large part by the baseline assumption that one makes about whether human life 
begins at conception or at birth.79  Similarly, the way that one balances the 
competing interests between the fetus and the mother that are raised by the 
issue of abortion is likely to be determined by the same baseline assumption.80  
The baseline assumption that one makes about when life begins is so salient 
that it is unlikely to go unnoticed or unscrutinized in a judicial analysis of the 
right to abortion.  However, the way that one feels about some of the collateral 
issues implicated in the abortion debate are likely to be determined by the tacit 
baseline assumptions that one makes. 
A collateral issue that has generated continuing controversy is the issue of 
whether the Constitution requires a right to abortion funding by the 
government.  In Maher v. Roe81 and Harris v. McRae,82 the Supreme Court 
held that the constitutional right to abortion that was recognized in Roe v. 
 
 78. Professor Cass R. Sunstein has made the following observation about Lochner: 
When the Court rejected Lochner, it did so largely on the ground that the common law 
baseline from which the Court had been operating could no longer be justified.  The Court 
recognized that respect for the common law baseline and for the existing distribution of 
wealth and entitlements could itself be governmental “action” or the product of faction; 
the common law was itself a creation of the legal system.  The lesson of the demise of 
Lochner was that common law or status quo baselines should no longer be used 
reflexively in public law. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 501–02 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 79. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–62 (discussing whether a fetus is a “person” within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 80. See id. at 163–66 (using trimester structure to balance competing interests); cf. Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (joint opinion of O’Connor, 
Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (adopting the “undue burden” balancing test to determine the 
constitutionality of restrictions on right to abortion). 
 81. 432 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1977) (upholding state regulation granting Medicaid benefits for 
childbirth but denying benefits for non-therapeutic abortions). 
 82. 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (upholding federal “Hyde Amendment” denying funding 
for even therapeutic abortions where life of mother was not threatened). 
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Wade83 does not compel the government to fund abortions for indigent women, 
even when the government chooses to fund medical services that are associated 
with childbirth.  However, the Court’s decisions denying a constitutional right 
to abortion-funding rest on an unstated baseline assumption whose validity can 
be called into question by shifting the analytical baseline. 
Because Roe v. Wade recognized a constitutional right to abortion,84 the 
government is precluded from penalizing the exercise of that right.  Indeed, 
Roe itself invalidated a state statute that imposed criminal penalties on the act 
of procuring an abortion.85  However, Maher and Harris held that the 
government refusals to fund abortions in those cases did not penalize the 
exercise of the right to abortion; they merely entailed a governmental decision 
not to subsidize the exercise of that right.86  The inability of the plaintiffs in 
those cases to pay for the abortions that they sought resulted from their own 
indigence, not from the government’s refusal to subsidize their desires.87  
Framed in this manner, the Court’s argument sounds both plausible and 
persuasive.  If the right to travel does not require the government to pay a 
traveler’s bus fare, the right to abortion should not require the government to 
fund a woman’s abortion.88  But by shifting the analytical baseline, the Court’s 
reasoning can be shown merely to rest on an unstated normative preference for 
childbirth over abortion. 
The argument advanced by the Court in Maher and Harris tacitly assumed 
that the government was doing nothing more than declining to subsidize 
abortions and that it was doing so in a neutral manner that was not intended to 
penalize the right to abortion.  But by shifting the analytical baseline to an 
earlier point in time, that tacit assumption loses its persuasive force.  Prior to 
adopting the abortion-funding measures at issue in Maher and Harris, the gov-
ernment already had in place benefits programs that were designed to pay for 
the medical services associated with pregnancy.  However, as the abortion 
issue became increasingly controversial, the government chose to exempt 
coverage for abortion services from those programs.89  Once the baseline is 
shifted to emphasize this fact, the government decisions not to fund abortions 
 
 83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–66. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. 
 87. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74 (government was merely refusing to fund the right to 
abortion); Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–178 (holding that the constitutional right to abortion does not 
mean that a woman is entitled to the financial means to fund an abortion). 
 88. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8 (using a bus fare analogy). 
 89. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 300–04 (discussing the recurring “Hyde Amendment” 
prohibition, first adopted in 1976, that restricts the use of federal funds for abortions under the 
Social Security Medicaid program adopted in 1965); Maher, 432 U.S. at 466 (discussing similar 
regulation adopted by the Connecticut Department of Welfare in 1975, restricting use of state 
funds for abortions). 
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no longer look like neutral revenue-saving measures.  Rather, they look like 
discriminatory governmental actions that are intended to discourage the 
exercise of the right to abortion.  Stated differently, the government’s actions 
no longer look like mere refusals to subsidize but rather like the imposition of 
a penalty on the right to abortion.  In amending the previous pregnancy 
benefits programs that were in place, the government decided that it would 
fund the termination of pregnancies when those pregnancies were terminated 
by childbirth but not when those pregnancies were terminated by abortion.  It 
is not a woman’s indigence that results in the denial of funding to terminate her 
pregnancy—indigent women can get government funding to terminate their 
pregnancies through childbirth.90  Rather, it is the government’s anti-abortion 
policy that results in the denial of the right to abortion.  So viewed, the gov-
ernment’s actions have both the intent and effect of penalizing the right to 
abortion.  Once again, it is possible that there are analytically defensible 
reasons for permitting the government to refrain from funding abortions, but 
those reasons are never addressed or defended in the Supreme Court’s 
abortion-funding opinions.  The Court’s decisions again rest on the normative 
values and political preferences of a majority of the Justices. 
Skillfully used, the technique of baseline shifting can enable one to isolate 
the point in a court’s analytical reasoning where the policy preferences of the 
judge are hidden.  By uncovering those vulnerable points in the court’s 
analysis, any unwarranted persuasive momentum created by a judicial opinion 
can be dissipated and a sounder analysis can be offered in its place.  But if the 
realists are correct, the “sounder” analysis can ultimately be shown to rest 
simply on an alternate set of normative preferences as well. 
B. Levels of Generality 
A second technique that can be useful in uncovering normative preferences 
of judges that are hidden in judicial opinions is the technique of manipulating 
levels of generality.  Legal arguments often assume a tacit level of generality 
in the analyses that they offer to justify their conclusions.  However, an 
argument that initially seems persuasive when evaluated at one level of 
generality may lose its persuasive power when evaluated at a different level of 
generality.  Therefore, shifting levels of generality is a good way to expose the 
vulnerable points in a court’s constitutional arguments.  Manipulating levels of 
generality can also be helpful in formulating constitutional arguments that 
advocates wish to have courts adopt. 
A simple illustration of the way in which an argument’s tacit level of 
generality can affect its persuasiveness is provided by the non-constitutional 
tort case of Salinetro v. Nystrom.91  The plaintiff was injured in an automobile 
 
 90. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–18; Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. 
 91. 341 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
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accident when she was four to six weeks pregnant.92  While treating the 
plaintiff for back injuries sustained in the accident, the defendant doctor took 
an X-ray of the plaintiff’s pelvis, which appears to have caused the death of the 
plaintiff’s fetus.93 The plaintiff then sued the defendant doctor for malpractice, 
alleging that he had been negligent in exposing the plaintiff to an X-ray 
without first asking her whether she was pregnant.94  However, the court 
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant doctor because the plaintiff had 
not established that the doctor’s alleged negligence caused the injury to the 
plaintiff’s fetus.95  The plaintiff’s own testimony revealed that the plaintiff 
herself was not yet aware of her pregnancy; therefore, the plaintiff would not 
have been able to inform the defendant of her pregnancy even if the defendant 
had asked the plaintiff whether she was pregnant.96  As a result the court 
concluded that there was no causal connection between the defendant doctor’s 
alleged negligence and any injury to the plaintiff’s fetus.97 
The court’s analysis seems persuasive when evaluated at the level of 
generality tacitly utilized in the court’s opinion.  However, if analyzed at a 
different level of generality, the court’s decision becomes much less 
defensible.  The court’s analysis occurred at a relatively low level of 
generality, focusing on the question of whether the doctor had been negligent 
in failing to ask the plaintiff whether she was pregnant.98  At that level of 
generality, the court’s conclusion about the lack of causation seems correct.  
But if the analysis is conducted at a higher level of generality it is relatively 
easy to conclude that the doctor was negligent and that the doctor’s negligence 
was the cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s fetus. 
If one views the negligence of the doctor as consisting of the failure to 
ascertain whether the plaintiff was pregnant—as opposed to merely failing to 
ask whether the plaintiff was pregnant—the plaintiff’s case looks much 
stronger.  Women with irregular menstrual cycles are often unaware that they 
are pregnant during the first four to six weeks of their pregnancies, and 
attentive doctors know that this is often the case.  Therefore, it may well be 
negligent for a doctor to rely solely on a woman’s negative answer to a ques-
tion about her pregnancy, without asking follow-up questions about the date of 
 
 92. Id. at 1060. 
 93. Id.  The actual cause of death is uncertain because the plaintiff followed her gyne-
cologist’s advice and underwent a therapeutic abortion.  However, a pathology report indicates 
that the fetus was dead at the time of the abortion.  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1061. 
 96. Salinetro, 341 So. 2d at 1061. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (“Assuming arguendo that Dr. Nystrom’s conduct fell below the standard of care in 
failing to inquire of Anna whether she was pregnant or not on the date of her last menstrual 
period, the omission was not the cause of her injury.”). 
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the woman’s last menstrual cycle, or without administering a quick and 
inexpensive over-the-counter pregnancy test.  Analyzed at this higher level of 
generality, the Salinetro court may well have been wrong to direct a verdict for 
the defendant.  The level of generality at which a court’s analysis is conducted 
can often end up being outcome determinative. 
Although Salinetro was a non-constitutional tort case, the level-of-
generality problem recurs frequently in constitutional cases.  A large portion of 
contemporary constitutional law entails the balancing of competing interests.99  
And interest-balancing is heavily dependent on the level of generality at which 
the competing interests are balanced.  Consider the constitutional case of New 
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.100  In Beazer, the plaintiffs filed a class 
action challenging a New York Transit Authority rule that denied employment 
to individuals who were narcotic drug users, including the plaintiffs, who were 
using the synthetic narcotic methadone as part of a drug treatment program for 
heroin addiction.101  The District Court made factual findings that people who 
had successfully remained in a methadone maintenance program for at least 
one year were as employable as other members of the public for low-risk 
Transit Authority jobs.102  As a group, they did not differ from other applicants 
in terms of their reliability, capability, safety, or efficiency.103  Accordingly, 
the District Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited the Transit 
Authority from using its overbroad narcotic rule to discriminate against 
employable applicants simply because they used methadone as part of a drug 
treatment program, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.104 
The Supreme Court reversed in a majority opinion by Justice Stevens, 
holding that the Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit the Transit Authority 
from discriminating against employable applicants on the basis of their 
methadone use.105  The Court conceded that exclusion by the Transit Authority 
of all methadone users from employment might be overbroad and even 
imprudent.106  But the Court noted that the one-year rule adopted by the 
District Court would also be both overbroad and underinclusive.107  The nature 
of general rules is that they have an imprecise fit with their intended 
objectives.  The only way to avoid such an imperfect fit was to abandon a rule-
based approach altogether and to grant individualized hearings to determine 
 
 99. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 943–49 (1987) (discussing role of balancing in contemporary constitutional law). 
 100. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
 101. Id. at 570–72. 
 102. Id. at 573–74. 
 103. Id. at 575–76. 
 104. Id. at 578–79. 
 105. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 594. 
 106. Id. at 592. 
 107. Id. at 592–94. 
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the employability of each applicant.108  However, such hearings could be very 
expensive and might not be justified in terms of the benefits that they pro-
duced.109  Accordingly, the Court held that the Equal Protection clause granted 
to the Transit Authority the discretion to strike the cost–benefit balance 
between general rules and individualized hearings at whatever point the Transit 
Authority deemed appropriate.110  The only constraint imposed on the Transit 
Authority’s discretion by the Equal Protection Clause was the requirement that 
the Transit Authority’s policy be within the range of reasonableness.111 
Justice Powell concurred in the majority’s holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause permitted the Transit Authority to ban the employment of 
current methadone users.  However, he dissented from the majority’s refusal to 
consider the constitutional claims of former methadone users.  The Transit 
Authority applied its narcotic rule to bar even the employment of individuals 
who had successfully completed a methadone treatment program, refusing to 
consider such individuals for employment until they had been drug-free for at 
least five years.112  Because there was no evidence that this five-year delay was 
necessary to ensure employability, Justice Powell argued that the Equal 
Protection Clause did not permit the Transit Authority to discriminate against 
individuals who had been certified as drug-free after completing a methadone 
treatment program.113 
Justice White dissented, emphasizing that the District Court findings were 
based on empirical evidence demonstrating that individuals who had 
successfully completed at least one year in a methadone treatment program 
were just as employable as members of the general population.114  Moreover, 
the Transit Authority did not ban the employment of ex-offenders, former al-
coholics, mental patients, diabetics, epileptics, and those currently using 
tranquilizers, even though some of those groups were on average less employ-
able than the excluded methadone users.115  Accordingly, Justice White argued 
that the Transit Authority rule discriminating against methadone users who had 
successfully completed one year of their treatment programs was so arbitrary 
that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.116 
 
 108. Id. at 589. 
 109. Id. at 590. 
 110. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 591–92. 
 111. See id. at 592–93. 
 112. Id. at 595 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 113. See id. at 597 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 114. Id. at 602–04 (White, J., dissenting). 
 115. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 610–11 (White, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 611 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that ban was unconstitutional as applied to 
applicants for low-risk positions who had successfully completed one year of methadone 
treatment). 
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All of the Justices in Beazer were balancing the competing interests 
between fairness to particular job applicants on the one hand and fairness to the 
public through a safe and cost-efficient transit system on the other.  The thing 
that differed among the various opinions in the case was the level of generality 
at which the Justices conducted their analyses.  The majority opinion of Justice 
Stevens was written at the highest level of generality, permitting the exclusion 
of all methadone users, regardless of the specific circumstances surrounding 
their employability or methadone use.117  Justice Powell’s opinion was written 
at an intermediate level of generality, permitting the exclusion from em-
ployment of all current methadone users but not of former methadone users 
who had completed their treatment programs within the past five years.118  Jus-
tice White’s dissent was written at the lowest level of generality, permitting the 
exclusion from employment of only those methadone users who were 
statistically less likely than the general public to be employable because they 
had not yet successfully completed one year of drug treatment.119 
The result that each Justice favored was determined by the level of 
generality that each Justice adopted.  Justice Stevens favored reading the Equal 
Protection Clause to grant broad discretion to the Transit Authority because he 
viewed the life circumstances of particular applicants to be constitutionally 
irrelevant.  At the other end of the spectrum, Justice White favored reading the 
Equal Protection Clause to grant much more limited discretion to the Transit 
Authority because he viewed the life circumstances of particular applicants to 
be constitutionally very relevant.  The meaning of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Constitution was, therefore, determined largely by the level of generality 
that each Justice deemed appropriate for the exercise of judicial review. 
There is a sense in which the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens 
seems correct.  The many imponderables entailed in trying to balance the costs 
and benefits of narrow employment rules that take account of particular life 
circumstances, against the costs and benefits of broad employment rules that 
ignore particular life circumstances, makes the task of balancing the competing 
interests both difficult and subjective.  For example, how much should it 
matter that the public might object to the employment of former heroin addicts, 
even though the former addicts empirically pose little risk of unemployability?  
How much should it matter that applicants may feel as if they have been 
treated more fairly under particularized standards than under more mechanical 
rules?  Should the cost–benefit analysis take account of the fact that the 
culture’s drug problems may be exacerbated if recovering former addicts are 
unable to secure gainful employment and therefore revert to drug use?  Should 
it matter if a rule addresses a marginal danger posed by methadone users but 
 
 117. See id. at 587–94 (Stevens, J.). 
 118. See id. at 594–97 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 119. See id. at 602–11 (White, J., dissenting). 
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wholly ignores a more serious danger posed by alcoholics?  What if the bulk of 
methadone users are members of racial minority groups, while the bulk of 
alcoholics are not?120  Is the degree to which an employment rule may have the 
effect of aggravating the culture’s racial tensions relevant to the cost–benefit 
analysis at issue?  Would it be better simply to abandon the use of rules al-
together and use more costly adjudicatory hearings to determine 
employability?  Would such a strategy help the economy by creating more jobs 
for lawyers and administrative hearing officials?  Or would it harm the 
environment by increasing transit fares and discouraging the use of mass 
transit?  Is a focus on the small danger posed by methadone use justifiable in a 
culture that largely ignores the more serious dangers posed by smoking and lax 
enforcement of speed limits?121 
Intractable questions such as these are difficult to answer with any degree 
of confidence.  Realizing this, the Beazer majority opinion stands for the 
proposition that deferential judicial review should be exercised in typical Equal 
Protection cases because the difficult task of striking the proper balance 
between the competing interests is a task that should be delegated to the 
politically accountable representative branches of government.  In a 
democracy, the cost–benefit determinations made by the representative 
branches should not be overridden by politically unaccountable judges who 
typically have no special expertise.122  Although we may never be able to say 
with confidence that we have struck the correct balance between competing 
imponderable interests, we should at least be able to say that we have struck 
the balance deemed appropriate by our democratically elected representatives.  
To do otherwise would risk the creation of a serious counter-majoritarian 
problem, where the Supreme Court holds an act of a coordinate branch of 
government unconstitutional simply because the Court disagrees with the way 
in which that branch of government balanced the competing interests.123 
Beazer demonstrates that the level of generality at which a legal argument 
is formulated affects the persuasiveness of that argument.  But the fact that 
legal outcomes are so heavily dependent on the applicable level of generality 
also affects the level of deference that is appropriate for judicial review in 
constitutional cases.  As Beazer suggests, the Supreme Court typically 
 
 120. Justice White argued that such a factor may have been what motivated the Transit 
Authority’s use of the methadone rule in Beazer.  See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White, J., 
dissenting) (suggesting that methadone rule may have been product of racial animus). 
 121. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 478–84 (discussing imponderables entailed in Beazer 
cost–benefit balancing). 
 122. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 592–94 (applying deferential rational basis review to 
governmental classifications that do not entail invidious discrimination against an unpopular 
group). 
 123. See STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 478–84 (discussing counter-majoritarian difficulties 
entailed in non-deferential review of interest balancing conducted by political branches). 
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exercises highly deferential, rational basis review in constitutional cases that 
do not involve suspect classifications or fundamental rights.124  Because of the 
imponderables involved, it is rare for the Court to invalidate the action of a 
representative branch under rational basis review.  However, there are some 
cases in which such invalidations do occur.125 
In Lawrence v Texas,126 the Supreme Court applied a rational basis 
standard of review but nevertheless held that a Texas statute criminalizing 
private homosexual activity unconstitutionally violated the right to liberty 
recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.127  In so 
holding, the Court overruled its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which 
had upheld the application of a Georgia criminal sodomy statute to homosexual 
activity.128  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence emphasized that 
the Bowers Court had erred in asserting that “[t]he issue presented is whether 
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy.”129  Justice Kennedy instead characterized the issue as 
whether the Federal Constitution conferred a fundamental right to liberty that 
encompassed the freedom of consenting adults to express the bonds of their 
relationship by privately engaging in intimate sexual conduct.130  What Justice 
Kennedy did was to shift his analysis to a higher level of generality, rejecting 
the decision of the Bowers Court to focus only on homosexual sodomy and 
replacing it with a more general focus on a right to intimate sexual privacy that 
is possessed by everyone. 
Justice Scalia dissented in Lawrence, arguing that any constitutional liberty 
or privacy right that might be fundamental enough to warrant invalidating the 
Texas statute would have to be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”131  In claiming that 
this could not possibly be the case in light of the nation’s long tradition of 
opposition to homosexual sodomy, Justice Scalia also shifted the level of 
generality.  He shifted it from the higher level of general sexual privacy that 
had been utilized by the majority back down to the lower level of homosexual 
sodomy that had been utilized by the Bowers Court.  But Justice Kennedy’s 
 
 124. Id. at 474–75, 481–84 (discussing rationale for deferential review in constitutional cases 
not involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights). 
 125. Id. at 488–99 (discussing cases in which Supreme Court invalidated governmental action 
even under rational basis standard of review). 
 126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 127. Id. at 578 (apparently applying rational basis standard of review); see also id. at 579–85 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that majority had applied rational basis standard of 
review). 
 128. 478 U.S. 186, 190–96 (1986). 
 129. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190). 
 130. Id. at 566–67. 
 131. See id. at 596  (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193–94). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
736 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:709 
response was to shift to a higher level of generality yet again.  In his Lawrence 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that there was not a long national 
tradition of opposition to homosexual sodomy, but rather a tradition of op-
position to all sodomy, whether homosexual or heterosexual.  Because the 
trend of enforcing sodomy laws against only homosexuals had begun as 
recently as the 1970s—and specific homosexual sodomy had been formally 
criminalized in only nine states—such discriminatory enforcement of the 
nation’s sodomy laws could hardly be characterized as a longstanding 
tradition.132  By manipulating the levels of generality that suited their instru-
mental objectives, Justices on both sides of the homosexual conduct debate 
were able to make their desired outcomes seem as if they flowed naturally 
from widely shared views of tradition and sexual privacy. 
The Supreme Court exhibited similar manipulations of the level of 
generality in its decision concerning the so-called right to die.  In Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health,133 the Court was willing to assume 
for the sake of argument that competent individuals possessed a fundamental 
right to decline medical treatment—including nutrition and hydration—that 
was protected as a liberty interest by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, even if declining treatment would result in death.134  The plaintiff 
in Cruzan had been injured in an automobile accident and had been in a 
persistent vegetative state for a period of seven years, with no evidence of 
significant cognitive functions.135  Because the plaintiff had virtually no chance 
of recovering her mental facilities, her parents wanted to terminate artificial 
nutrition and hydration life-support procedures.136  The question presented in 
Cruzan was whether a Missouri statute could constitutionally require a surro-
gate to show by clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person 
would desire the termination of treatment before the State would allow the 
termination of nutrition and hydration. 
The Court, in a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that the 
Due Process Clause did permit Missouri to adopt this clear and convincing 
procedural safeguard.137  Rehnquist noted that a balance had to be struck 
between the constitutional rights of incompetents to terminate treatment and 
the right of a state to ensure the accuracy of treatment termination decisions.138  
He concluded that Missouri was constitutionally permitted to adopt a clear and 
convincing rule of decision as a means of ensuring such accuracy in order to 
 
 132. See id. at 567–73. 
 133. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 134. Id. at 278–79. 
 135. Id. at 265. 
 136. Id. at 267. 
 137. See id. at 280. 
 138. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
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advance the state’s important interest in the protection and preservation of 
human life.139 
Justice Brennan dissented in a way that tacitly shifted the pertinent level of 
generality. Although the majority had found that the state had a high interest in 
the protection and preservation of human life,140 Brennan argued that the state 
actually had no interest whatsoever in protecting the life of a person in a 
persistent vegetative state who wanted her treatment terminated.141  The 
insistence on continued life-support against the wishes of such a person would 
serve no benefit to society or to any third person and would violate the very 
constitutional right to terminate treatment whose existence the majority had 
assumed.142  Accordingly, the state’s only interest was in ensuring accuracy, 
and that interest was better advanced by the normal preponderance standard of 
proof that is applied in ordinary civil cases than by a heightened clear and con-
vincing standard of proof that could end up prolonging the plaintiff’s treatment 
against the plaintiff’s wishes.143 
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan balanced the same 
competing interests between the plaintiff and the state.  But they were able to 
arrive at different conclusions because they compared those competing 
interests to each other at different levels of generality.  Both the nature of the 
plaintiff’s interest in terminating treatment and the state’s interest in protecting 
life can be stated at different levels of generality, and the level of generality 
can be outcome determinative.  Like the technique of baseline shifting, the 
technique of manipulating levels of generality can be useful both to expose 
hidden weaknesses in a court’s opinions and to hide potential weaknesses in an 
advocate’s own arguments to a court. 
C. Deconstruction 
A third technique that can be useful in uncovering the normative values 
and political preferences of judges that may not be apparent on the face of a 
judicial opinion is the technique of deconstruction.  The term “deconstruction” 
is now often used to refer to any process for questioning the soundness of an 
argument.  My use of the term, however, is intended to be more precise.  For 
me, deconstruction refers to the process of demonstrating that a logical 
argument can be reformulated to generate the opposite of the conclusion that it 
was originally offered to support.  This process, in turn, reveals that it is the 
 
 139. Id. at 280–85. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. at 313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 142. Id. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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normative preferences of the person making the argument—rather than the 
syllogistic application of logical rules to legal principles—that are responsible 
for the asserted conclusion. 
Although the concept of deconstruction was initially associated with 
continental philosophy and critical literary theory, Professor Jack Balkin has 
described how the inversion of hierarchies can be used to deconstruct legal 
arguments.144  Legal rules typically rest on hierarchical oppositions.  A rule 
treats one state of affairs favorably because that state of affairs advances a 
socially desirable goal, and it treats the opposing state of affairs unfavorably 
because that state of affairs advances a socially undesirable goal.  The process 
of deconstruction simply reverses the supposed connection between the 
opposing states of affairs and the pertinent goals, thereby inverting the 
hierarchy that was initially claimed to exist.  Once a rule is deconstructed, 
therefore, it points not to the conclusion that it was initially offered to support, 
but rather to the opposite conclusion.145 
Balkin offers a simple illustration of the process by deconstructing the 
constitutional law of standing.  The Supreme Court has held that Article III of 
the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases in which 
the plaintiff suffers some real or threatened injury, as opposed to having a mere 
ideological interest in the resolution of a legal issue.  The pertinent opposition, 
therefore, is the opposition between actual injury and mere ideological interest.  
The Article III standing rule establishes a hierarchy between these oppositions 
by privileging actual injury and disfavoring mere ideological interest.  Injury is 
privileged because plaintiffs who suffer an actual injury are likely to be 
vigorous advocates in our adversary system and are likely to present the legal 
issues in a concrete factual context that is suitable for judicial resolution.  Mere 
ideological interest is disfavored because ideological plaintiffs are unlikely to 
provide the adversary motivation or concrete factual context needed to help the 
court reach a proper and narrow resolution of the pertinent issues.146 
The Article III law of standing can be deconstructed by inverting the 
hierarchies—or stated differently, by reversing the connections between the 
two oppositions and their supposed instrumental consequences.  Although 
conventional Supreme Court wisdom privileges actual injury in order to 
promote vigorous advocacy in a concrete adversary context, actual injury is in 
fact a bad surrogate for those objectives because it does not ensure the 
 
 144. See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 743–72 
(1987) (discussing deconstruction); see also Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies 
Perspective on Contract Law and Practice, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 233–50 (1988) 
(illustrating use of inversion of hierarchies technique to deconstruct various contract doctrines). 
 145. See Balkin, supra note 144, at 746–51 (discussing inversion of hierarchies); see also 
Spann, supra note 144, at 231–32 (same). 
 146. See Balkin, supra note 144, at 754–55 (discussing hierarchy established by Article III 
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requisite motivational zeal.  And although the conventional wisdom is that 
ideological interest is not likely to advance those objectives, ideological 
interest is actually a good surrogate for the Court’s justiciability concerns be-
cause ideological commitment to an issue is likely to promote zealous legal 
advocacy.147 
For example, under the traditional law of standing, a backwoods hermit 
having little interest or contact with outside civilization would have standing to 
complain about the environmental harm caused by a government construction 
project.  This would be true even if the particularized adverse impact on the 
hermit was very small, and even if the hermit had limited resources and limited 
expertise to bring to bear on the environmental litigation.  However, a 
recognized environmental group would not have standing to complain about 
the same injury, even if the environmental group would be a significantly 
better litigant in terms of motive, resources and expertise.  This would be true 
even if the environmental group could provide the court with a much more 
highly developed factual context for the litigation, including scientific evi-
dence about the pertinent environmental harms, as well as the costs and 
benefits of potential alternatives.148  The ideological interest of a group that 
was formed for the express purpose of participating in environmental 
protection litigation is, therefore, much more likely to satisfy the Court’s 
justiciability concerns than the presence of a technical injury to a random 
individual who happens to be a member of a population that is exposed to dirty 
air. 
Deconstructing the Supreme Court’s constitutional law of standing in this 
manner shows that the Court’s own instrumental objectives are better served 
by reversing the Court’s hierarchy of privileged and disfavored states of 
affairs.  Because the standing rule does not advance the interests that are said 
to be advanced by that rule, something more subjective must be motivating the 
Court’s standing decisions.  This suggests that, whatever the Supreme Court’s 
standing opinions may say, the law of standing actually rests on unarticulated 
normative values and political preferences possessed by the Justices. 
The Supreme Court’s current law of racial affirmative action can also be 
deconstructed.  After more than a decade of flirting with the appropriate 
standard of review for benign racial affirmative action programs,149 a majority 
of the Court has now settled on strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard for 
 
 147. See id. (inverting hierarchy established by Article III injury requirement for standing). 
 148. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–41 (1972) (holding that standing must be 
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all racial classifications, whether benign or invidious.150  Unlike the deferential 
rational basis review that the Court applied in cases such as New York City 
Transit Authority v. Beazer151 and Lawrence v. Texas,152 the strict judicial 
scrutiny that the Court applies to racial affirmative action is very non-deferen-
tial.  A racial affirmative action plan can survive strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution only if it is shown to the Court’s 
satisfaction that the plan advances a compelling governmental interest and is 
narrowly tailored to the advancement of that interest.153  Most recently, the Su-
preme Court upheld an affirmative action program for minority student admis-
sions at the University of Michigan Law School in Grutter v. Bollinger,154 
finding that both prongs of the strict scrutiny standard were satisfied.  On the 
same day, however, the Court also invalidated an affirmative action program 
for minority student admissions at the University of Michigan undergraduate 
college of Literature, Science and the Arts in Gratz v. Bollinger, finding that 
the undergraduate program was not narrowly tailored.155 
The current Supreme Court’s support of affirmative action is at best 
reluctant and ambivalent.  The Supreme Court views the racial classifications 
used in affirmative action programs as sufficiently suspect to trigger strict 
scrutiny because the Court has endorsed a hierarchy under which colorblind 
race neutrality is privileged and race consciousness is disfavored.156  
Colorblind race neutrality is privileged because it promotes an allocation of 
societal resources that is based on merit rather than on the irrelevant 
happenstance of race.  Race-conscious affirmative action classifications are 
disfavored because they distribute benefits and burdens solely on the basis of 
race, which is morally illegitimate in a liberal culture that is founded on the 
principle of respect for individual identity rather than mere group 
membership.157  Stated more succinctly, most race-neutral allocations of 
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affirmative action); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (same); Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 223–37 (1995) (same). 
 151. 440 U.S. 568, 590–94 (1979) (applying rational basis standard of review); see also supra 
notes 100–25 and accompanying text (discussing Beazer). 
 152. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (apparently applying rational basis standard of review); see id. 
at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that majority had applied rational basis standard 
of review); see also supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text (discussing Lawrence). 
 153. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–29. 
 154. Id. at 322–24, 327–43. 
 155. 539 U.S. at 247–76. 
 156. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that 
the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the personal right of all people to be free from racial 
discrimination). 
 157. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
individuals rather than groups and that group classifications are typically “irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (stating that racial classifications are too pernicious to be 
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resources are privileged because they advance racial equality, while most race-
conscious affirmative action programs are disfavored because they are racially 
discriminatory. 
Once again, the Supreme Court’s affirmative action hierarchy can be 
inverted so that the consequences the Court associates with each pole of the 
hierarchy are first detached and then re-attached to the opposite poles.  The 
Court asserts that race neutrality is good because it advances the culture’s 
aspirational goal of achieving a society in which race becomes irrelevant to the 
allocation of resources.  However, it is really race-conscious affirmative action 
that advances this goal.  Due to centuries of past racial discrimination—
ranging from the appropriation of Indian lands,158 to slavery,159 to official 
segregation,160 to the internment of Japanese-American citizens,161 to de facto 
segregation,162—racial minorities have been the victims of the race-conscious 
allocation of desirable resources to the white majority.  As a result, racial 
minorities remain seriously underrepresented in the distribution of societal 
 
tolerated without exacting scrutiny of their justifications); Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 
U.S. 200, 214 (1995)  (“The Court observed—correctly—that ‘distinctions between citizens 
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality,’ and that ‘racial discriminations are in most 
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited.’” (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(maintaining that the government can never have a compelling interest in creating racial 
classifications and rejecting concept of racial entitlement as inconsistent with liberal focus on 
individuality); id. at 240–41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (racial 
distinctions are immoral and unconstitutional); J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The moral imperative of racial neutrality is the 
driving force of the Equal Protection Clause.”); id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“Discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and 
destructive of democratic society.” (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 
133 (1975)). 
 158. See Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding 
that European discovery of land now constituting United States and conquest of indigenous 
Indian inhabitants divested Indians of title to that land). 
 159. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (invalidating congressional 
statute prohibiting slavery in Louisiana Territory). 
 160. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial 
segregation). 
 161. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military 
exclusion order that led to internment of Japanese-American citizens). 
 162. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973) (adopting 
expansive interpretation of de jure segregation but reaffirming prohibition on use of race-
conscious remedies to eliminate de facto segregation); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971) (same); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1976) 
(reading the Equal Protection Clause to permit racially disparate impact not directly caused by 
intentional discrimination). 
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benefits and seriously overrepresented in the distribution of societal burdens.163  
By privileging prospective race neutrality in the allocation of resources, the 
Court is both freezing and perpetuating those existing inequalities.  Therefore, 
a preference for colorblind race neutrality actually ends up constituting a 
preference for continued racial discrimination because it requires racial 
minorities to be better and to work harder than the white majority simply to 
catch up and keep pace with whites. 
The Court also asserts that race-conscious affirmative action is bad 
because it forces us to think in terms of racial categories, which ignore the 
concept of individual identity that is essential to the foundations of our liberal 
culture.  In so doing, we unfairly and stereotypically treat people as if their 
identities were determined merely by the racial groups in which they are 
members, rather than by their own particular attributes and abilities.  However, 
it is really colorblind race neutrality that forces us to ignore individual identity 
and to think stereotypically in terms of racial categories.  Because the white 
majority has the economic, political, and social power to define the norms that 
will prevail in United States culture, cultural norms end up being white norms.  
Racial minorities, therefore, tend to be judged not on their own merits but 
rather on the degree to which they do or do not live up to the white norms that 
govern appropriate appearance, attitudes, and behavior.  Affirmative action 
seeks to counteract this tendency by ensuring that at least a small percentage of 
society’s resources are distributed to racial minorities on the basis of their 
individual merit, rather than on the basis of their compliance with white 
cultural norms.  It is affirmative action that advances the liberal ideal of 
individual identity by relaxing the hold that white culture has over racial 
minority identity.164 
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action hierarchy is backward.  It is af-
firmative action that is good, because affirmative action promotes racial 
equality in the allocation of resources and advances our interests in liberal 
individuality and merit.  And it is colorblind race neutrality that is bad, because 
colorblind race neutrality perpetuates our existing forms of racial discrimina-
tion and overrides our concern for individuality by insisting that everyone in 
our increasingly diverse culture comply with the norms of the prevailing white 
culture.  Once again, it appears that the Supreme Court’s normative values and 
political preferences—rather than the “law” of Equal Protection—are what 
have generated the Supreme Court’s doctrinal views about affirmative action. 
 
 163. Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Gratz contains statistics illustrating existing 
racial inequalities in the distribution of societal resources.  See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 
299–303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 164. For more elaborate critiques that I have offered of the Supreme Court’s law of 
affirmative action, see Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 
1 (1995); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2004); 
Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2004). 
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It probably comes as no surprise to anyone that political preferences in-
fluence the arguments that Supreme Court Justices make with respect to 
controversial issues such as affirmative action.  However, the process of 
deconstruction can also be used to reverse implicit hierarchies where the 
normative values and political preferences of the Justices are less apparent.  
Consider once again the case of Lochner v. New York,165 where the Supreme 
Court invalidated a New York statute prescribing maximum hours for the em-
ployment of bakers on the grounds that the statute interfered with the freedom 
of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendement’s Due Process Clause.166  
As has been discussed,167 that decision rested on the baseline assumption that a 
“natural” economic market was being distorted by the maximum-hours subsidy 
that the statute granted to workers.  Shifting the analytical baseline, however, 
revealed that the maximum-hours legislation did not distort the market in favor 
of workers any more than the law’s underlying enforcement of private 
contracts distorted the market in favor of employers.168 
One possible response to this baseline shifting maneuver in Lochner is to 
distinguish the maximum-hours subsidy for workers from the contract-
enforcement subsidy for employers.  Unlike the market-distorting subsidies 
granted to workers in the form of maximum-hours legislation, state 
enforcement of private agreements through the regime of contract law is not 
really a market subsidy at all.  Rather, public enforcement of contracts is 
designed to structure the economic market instead of providing a subsidy to 
particular players in that market.  This attempted distinction rests on a 
hierarchy between market structuring and market subsidies.  Government 
intervention designed to structure the market is privileged because properly 
functioning markets can be relied upon to facilitate the efficient allocation of 
goods and services in society by ensuring that goods and services go to those 
who value them most highly.169  Government intervention designed to 
subsidize particular players in the market is disfavored because those subsidies 
distort market functioning in a way that undermines the efficient allocation of 
goods and services by permitting some goods and services to go to those who 
value them less highly than others.170 
This distinction between market-structuring contract law and market-
distorting subsidies can be deconstructed by inverting the supposed hierarchy 
 
 165. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 166. See id. at 64–65. 
 167. See supra notes 59–78 and accompanying text (discussing Lochner). 
 168. See id. 
 169. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13 (1998) (defining 
efficiency as “allocation of resources in which value is maximized”); id. § 3.1, at 36–39 (noting 
that efficiency is increased through transferability of rights in economic markets). 
 170. See id. § 1.2, at 16 (discussing potential inefficiency of forced exchanges as opposed to 
market exchanges); id. § 8.2, at 276 (discussing economic effect of subsidies). 
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on which it rests.  The initial hierarchy asserts that contract law is good 
because, by providing for the enforcement of private agreements, it structures 
the market in a way that promotes the efficient allocation of resources through 
market ordering.  People who value goods and services more highly than 
others will feel secure in paying more than their competitors for those goods 
and services because the rules of contract law will protect their investments by 
enforcing their purchase agreements.171  However, government enforcement of 
private agreements through the operation of contract law is actually bad 
because it ends up undermining efficient market ordering.  That is because 
contract law will not enforce all private agreements, but rather will enforce 
only those private agreements of which contract law approves.  It will not 
enforce a contract to purchase heroin or a contract to murder someone, no 
matter how highly the parties value those goods and services.172  More mun-
danely, contract law will not enforce even the remedies for breach to which the 
parties themselves agree unless the rules of contract law approve of those 
remedies.  Although the parties may agree that specific performance or penalty 
provisions will provide the appropriate level of incentive to ensure the 
performance of their mutual obligations, the law will award specific 
performance in only narrowly circumscribed circumstances173 and will not 
enforce penalty provisions for mere breach of contract at all.174  This selective 
enforcement of contract provisions distorts market ordering by depriving the 
parties of the ability to express the intensity of their preference through their 
willingness to pay.  As a result, goods and services will not necessarily go to 
the users who value them most highly, but rather will go to those whom the 
many filtering rules of contract law deem most deserving.175  No matter how 
much I want Reading pipe for the plumbing in my new house, contract law will 
not enforce my efforts to get Reading pipe if the law views the incentives I 
have chosen as excessive—even if I am willing to pay extra consideration to 
my contracting partner for those incentives as a means of expressing the 
intensity of my preference.176  Contract law’s variable enforcement of private 
 
 171. See id. § 4.1, at 101–08 (discussing economic function served by contract law en-
forcement of private agreements). 
 172. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (3d ed. 2004) 
(discussing contract law restrictions on enforcement of illegal contracts). 
 173. See 3 id. §§ 12.4–12.8, at 161–203 (discussing contract law limitations on specific per-
formance). 
 174. See 3 id. § 12.18, at 300 (discussing contract law refusal to enforce penalty provisions). 
 175. See generally 1 id. at xi–xix (Table of Contents listing plethora of contract rules that 
restrict enforcement of contracts). 
 176. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) (refusing to award specific 
performance or substantial damages for breach of construction contract calling for use of Reading 
pipe); see also JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 833–34 (8th ed. 
2003) (quoting explicit contract language requiring replacement of all non-conforming 
construction, which the court refused to enforce). 
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agreements, therefore, does not structure the market, but rather distorts the 
market by selectively subsidizing only those agreements that the law of con-
tracts deems desirable. 
The initial hierarchy also asserts that maximum-hours legislation is bad 
because by subsidizing one side in employer–employee labor contract 
negotiations, such legislation distorts market ordering through the inefficient 
provision of employment benefits to the subsidized employees.  Because those 
employees did not value the benefits highly enough to make the economic 
concessions necessary to secure them in contract negotiations with their 
employers, those benefits end up being extracted from the employers who 
value them more highly than they are valued by the employees—even though 
the employers would have been able to retain those benefits in the absence of 
the market-distorting subsidy to the employees.177  However, the statutory 
maximum-hours subsidy is actually good because it ends up correcting for a 
serious market defect in a way that is necessary to permit the market to allocate 
goods and services in an efficient manner.  In order for economic markets to 
operate efficiently, by allocating goods and services to those who value them 
most highly, some reliable scale has to be used to measure the intensity of 
competing preferences for goods and service. 
Economics is premised on the belief that the willingness to pay money is a 
reliable measure of the intensity of one’s preferences.178  However, the 
marginal utility of money declines as one’s wealth increases, so that a dollar is 
worth more to someone who is poor than it is to someone who is rich.  This 
“wealth effect” distorts the operation of economic markets by undermining the 
reliability of willingness to pay as a measure of preference intensity.179  
Employers typically have considerably more wealth than employees, thereby 
permitting employers to extract inefficient bargaining concessions from 
employees during contract negotiations.  That is because resources having 
economic value often end up being retained by employers, even though 
employees value them more highly, simply because employees lack the money 
necessary to express the intensity of their preferences.  The one-sided subsidy 
that maximum-hours legislation gives to employees in labor contract nego-
tiations with their employers, therefore, becomes an economic palliative for 
this wealth-effect market distortion.  It not only helps employees accurately 
express the intensity of their preferences in the labor market, but more 
significantly, it helps the market itself allocate goods and services to the users 
who genuinely value them most highly. 
 
 177. See POSNER, supra note 169, § 1.2, at 16 (discussing the potential inefficiency of forced 
exchanges, as opposed to market exchanges); id. § 8.2 at 276 (discussing the economic effect of 
subsidies). 
 178. See id. § 1.2, at 12 (defining value as willingness to pay). 
 179. See id. (describing wealth effects). 
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The initial economic hierarchy in Lochner is backward.  The maximum-
hours subsidy to workers is good, rather than bad, because it is that subsidy 
that permits economic markets to work efficiently in the allocation of goods 
and services to those who value them most highly by correcting for market-
distorting wealth effects.  And the market-structuring rules of contract law are 
bad, rather than good, because it is those rules that distort efficient market 
ordering by selectively enforcing only those market preferences of which 
contract law itself approves, thereby undermining the ability of the market to 
direct goods and services to the users who value them most highly.  Even when 
legal doctrine is paired with other disciplines, such as economics, it is still the 
normative values and political preferences of judges that ultimately end up 
determining the outcome of constitutional cases. 
The fact that constitutional arguments can be deconstructed by inverting 
the hierarchies on which those arguments rest does not mean that those 
constitutional arguments are wrong.  It is important to remember that a 
deconstructed argument can always be deconstructed yet again, to re-establish 
the original hierarchy.  For example, the market-structuring rules of contract 
law in Lochner can once again be made good, rather than bad, by emphasizing 
that the selective enforcement inclinations of contract law are actually effi-
cient.  Contract rules reflect centuries of experience with the types of 
preferences that individuals tend to have over the range of cases, thereby sav-
ing the administrative costs that would otherwise have to be incurred if we 
were to make efficiency determinations from scratch in each individual case.180  
And the maximum-hours subsidy to employees can again be made bad, rather 
than good, by emphasizing that haphazard efforts to correct for wealth effects 
are as likely to exacerbate as to correct for market distortions.  Therefore, the 
most sensible way to make efficiency determinations is simply to assume the 
adequacy of the existing distribution of resources and to focus our attention on 
the prospective efficiency of market transactions.181  There is no stopping point 
in the deconstruction process, short of the constraints imposed by limitations 
on our own analytical creativity. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The meaning of the post-realist Constitution is ultimately determined by 
the normative values and political preferences of a majority of the Justices on 
the Supreme Court.  Those normative values and political preferences are 
constitutionalized through Supreme Court opinions that purport to demonstrate 
how the Court’s outcomes flow logically from the language, structure, and 
 
 180. See id. § 4.1, at 104–06 (discussing efficiency-enhancing function of contract default 
rules). 
 181. See id. § 1.2, at 15 (discussing economic focus on efficiency rather than distributional 
consequences). 
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original intent of the Constitution.  But the analytical techniques that the Court 
uses to make such demonstrations can also be brought to bear on the Court’s 
own arguments in a way that exposes the analytically vulnerable points in the 
Court’s opinions.  By shifting the baselines implicit in court’s analyses, by 
manipulating the level of generality assumed in the Court’s opinions, and by 
deconstructing the Court’s instrumental arguments through the inversion of the 
hierarchies that the Court adopts, students of constitutional law can illuminate 
the manner in which the normative values and political preferences of the 
Court play a dispositive role in generating the Court’s constitutional outcomes.  
These same techniques can also be used by practitioners and commentators to 
formulate arguments explaining why the Court should constitutionalize the 
normative values and political preferences that those practitioners and com-
mentators believe to be appropriate.  Mastering such techniques is the essence 
of learning how to do constitutional law. 
A jurisprudentially more interesting question concerns what effect this 
view of the Constitution as a repository for privileged normative values and 
political preferences ought to have on the culture’s continued commitment to 
the institution of judicial review.  If the Constitution has only the content that 
the Supreme Court chooses to give it, why should the culture persist in 
believing that the institution of judicial review is an acceptable mode of public 
policy-making in a society that is committed to the principle of democratic 
self-governance?  Why should the normative values and political preferences 
of the politically unaccountable Supreme Court ever take precedence over the 
normative values and political preferences of the people, as expressed through 
the actions of the representative branches of government?  In a post-realist 
legal culture, the counter-majoritarian problem inherent in the exercise of 
judicial review looms as a potentially insoluble problem.  If there are good 
reasons for the culture’s continued adherence to the institution of post-realist 
judicial review, it makes sense to try to ascertain and articulate what those 
reasons might be.  If there are no good reasons—or if the reasons are actually 
bad reasons that relate to the preservation of an often unjust and oppressive 
status quo—perhaps it is time to promote judicial review to the status of an in-
triguing artifact of the nation’s pre-realist history.  I suspect that the most 
important thing there is to teach about constitutional law is the need to 
formulate a considered position on the propriety of judicial review, rather than 
simply abstaining, as the bulk of contemporary culture seems so content to do. 
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